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REPORT

The Association Between the Bolsa Família Conditionalities and the Social Mobility of its Beneficiaries

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Bolsa Família Program (BFP) has consolidated itself as one of the main instruments to combat poverty in Brazil in the last two decades. Created from the unification and expansion of several existing social programs, the BFP was inspired by the model of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). The program combines the granting of monetary benefits to low-income families with the fulfillment of conditionalities linked to the behavior of its members, especially with regard to school attendance of children and adolescents and the health monitoring of pregnant women and children. This architecture has a dual objective: to provide immediate poverty alleviation and to foster, through the formation of human capital, and the reduction of the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Fassarella et al., 2024; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Molina Millán et al., 2019).

The literature extensively documents the positive effects of CCTs on indicators such as school literacy, class attendance, and use of preventive health services (Fernald et al., 2008; Garcia & Saavedra, 2023). Studies also point out that, by conditioning desirable benefits and behaviors, programs can correct family investment gaps and improve the aggregate welfare (Mookherjee & Napel, 2021). In addition, conditionalities can contribute to improving the targeting of benefits, functioning as a filter that favors the most vulnerable (Bergstrom & Dodds, 2021). However, the effects of these programs depend critically on an often overlooked component: the ability of the state to effectively monitor and enforce these requirements.

Most studies assume that the monitoring of conditionalities occurs universally and homogeneously. However, evidence suggests that the frequency and quality of follow-up vary significantly between locations, reflecting inequalities in administrative capacity and the provision of public services (Heinrich & Knowles, 2020). Monitoring ends up being treated as an implicit element of the structure of the programs, without directly measuring it. As a result, little is known about which families are effectively monitored, how regularly, and how this relates to the expected outcomes of conditionalities.

In this article, we contribute to filling this gap by using administrative microdata from the Ministry of Development and, Social Assistance, Family and Fight against Hunger (MDS) and the Unified Registry (CadÚnico) to measure the effective monitoring of health and education conditionalities between the years 2010 and 2023. By linking census databases, we built an annual monitoring indicator per family based on the requirement that all members subject to conditionalities have been monitored in all required periods in the year. This restrictive definition makes it possible to identify the coverage of state action and then analyze compliance among those monitored.

Thus, we conducted our empirical analysis in two stages. In the first, we outline the panorama of the monitoring of conditionalities both in space and time, focusing on education conditionalities. In

the second, we conducted an empirical exercise to identify the extent to which there is a statistical association between the fulfillment of conditionalities and the social mobility[1] of the dependents of families enrolled in the BFP. We also discuss, in this second moment, the possible long-term ramifications of the fulfillment of the PBF conditionalities for individuals who were unable to emancipate themselves from this government program at the age of 24.

The results of the study indicate that the monitoring of BFP conditionalities varies widely between regions and over time, being more frequent in coastal areas and in regions with greater institutional capacity. Although the average monitoring rate remained stable at around 60% between 2010 and 2023 (excluding the pandemic period), the compliance rate among those monitored is high, above 90% for health and education.

The econometric analysis shows that consistent compliance with educational conditionalities during adolescence is positively associated with more favorable outcomes in early adulthood. Young people whose families met the requirements of the program are more likely to complete high school, surpass their mother's schooling, and be inserted in the labor market, especially among young men. Among young women, there is also a lower probability of remaining dependent on social programs, which suggests greater upward social mobility. Importantly, there is evidence that young people who are still included in the CadÚnico at the age of 24 have a higher level of education when their families comply with the conditionalities, which may indicate a transitory phase of investment in human capital that has not yet been reflected in sufficient income to get out of poverty.

The report is organized as follows: chapter 2 presents the institutional context; chapter 3 describes the data and the construction of the variables; chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis and the main results; and chapter 5 discusses the implications and paths for progress in the management of conditionalities.

[1]We use the term *social mobility* broadly, referring to the change in the position of individuals in the structure of social stratification, approximated in this study by the emancipation of social programs and by indicators of education and insertion in the labor market.

2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, we describe the conditionalities of the BFP, that is, the obligations that the family must fulfill in order to continue receiving benefits. In the second, we explain how this compliance is monitored.

2.1 Health and Education Conditionalities

The BFP was created by Provisional Measure No. 132/2003, converted into Law No. 10,863/2004, and it provided variable benefits for pregnant women, nursing mothers, and children up to 15 years of age. The health conditionalities involved prenatal care for pregnant women and, for children up to 7 years of age, up-to-date vaccination and six-monthly weight and height checks. Education conditionalities required a minimum school attendance of 85% for children between 6 and 15 years of age.

As of 2007, the *Bolsa Jovem Variável* was included, extending educational conditionalities to adolescents aged 16 to 17 years, with a minimum attendance requirement of 75%.[1] In 2021, the BFP was replaced by the *Auxílio Brasil*, and the attendance rules were adjusted to 60% for children aged between 4 and 5 years, and 75% for young people aged between 6 and 21 years.[2,3] In 2023, the New BFP was introduced, with benefits by family composition that included people between 0 and 17 years of age, pregnant women, and nursing mothers. The conditionalities are the same as for *Auxílio Brasil*, except for the requirement of school attendance for young people between 18 and 21 years of age.

Table 2.1 summarizes education requirements by age group between 2003 and 2025. Health conditions remained stable: pregnant women should have prenatal care, and children up to 7 years of age should undergo six-monthly follow-ups and keep their vaccination schedule up to date.

2.2 Monitoring of Conditionalities

Monitoring involves several agencies and spheres of government and is carried out in a decentralized manner. The MDS identifies the public based on payroll and CadÚnico, and passes this information on to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education.[4] These data are consolidated in the

[1] Provisional Measure No. 411/2007, later converted into Law No. 11,692/2008.
[2] The *Auxílio Brasil* was instituted by Law No. 14,284/2021.
[3] With respect to young people between 18 and 21 years of age, the attendance rule concerns those who have not completed Basic Education.
[4] The BFP payroll is built based on the CadÚnico of the previous month.

Table 2.1. Minimum School Attendance Required as Conditionality – BFP and *Auxílio Brasil*

	Former BFP		*Auxílio Brasil*	New BFP
	03-07	07-21	22-23	23 - ...
4 to 5 years	-	-	60%	60%
6 to 15 years	85%	85%	75%	75%
16 to 17 years	-	75%	75%	75%
18 to 21 years*	-	-	75%	-

* Those who have not completed basic education.

Table 2.2. Timeline of Monitoring Education Conditionalities in a Year

Public		Data		Consequences	
Reference	Payroll	Follow-up	Registration	Repercussion	Appeal
Jan	Feb	Feb & Mar	Apr	May	Jun
Mar	Apr	Apr & May	Jun	Jul	Ago
May	Jun	Jun & Jul	Ago	Sep	Oct
Jul	Ago	Ago & Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Sep	Oct	Oct & Nov	Dec	Mar*	Abr*

* Following year.

Conditionality System (Sicon), which is shared with states and municipalities. The conditionalities are monitored at the municipal level, and the information is recorded in the respective systems. The repercussions begin with notification and can be interrupted by appealing to social assistance.

Table 2.2 shows the months in which each of these stages occurs for education conditionalities. School attendance is monitored bimonthly, with the exception of the months of December and January.

Table 2.3 shows the months of monitoring of health conditionalities, which occur on a semi-annual basis. In addition to the conditionalities, the BFP Health Management System also has regulations to guide the pregnant women beneficiaries during the follow-up period. In addition to being monitored in relation to prenatal care, the families of pregnant women also start to receive additional benefits from BFP for pregnant women.

Non-compliance entails a warning, blocking the benefit for one month (with release the following month), and, in case of recurrence, suspension of the benefit for two months without refund. Since 2012, definitive exclusion only occurs after the monitoring by the social assistance team. In this process, the family must remain at least six months without further suspensions over a 12-month probatory period. Otherwise, the family may be disconnected from the program or lose the benefit related to the adolescent.

Table 2.3. Timeline of Monitoring Health Conditionalities in a Year

Public		Data		Consequences	
Reference	Payroll	Follow-up	Registration	Repercussion	Appeal
Nov	Dec	Jan-Jun*	Feb-Jun*	Sep*	Oct*
May	Jun	Jul-Dec	Ago-Dec	Mar*	Apr*

* Following year.

3. DATA

We built two databases to conduct our analyses. The first, described in section 3.1, characterizes the monitoring and fulfillment of the health and education conditionalities imposed on each beneficiary family to remain in the BFP. The second, characterized in section 3.2, is used to measure the association between the BFP conditionalities compliance and social mobility of young people between 13 and 17 years of age with different individual and family characteristics.

3.1 Follow-up of Families in the BFP

We used the conditionality monitoring data provided by the MDS to identify the universe of families that met any of the conditions imposed to remain in the program for at least one monitoring period. For each of these families, we identified: (i) those that were actively monitored in relation to health and education; and (ii) those that were monitored and complied with the education and health conditionalities.

Two databases were provided regarding the fulfillment of conditionalities between 2010 and 2023. The first contains all pregnant women and children up to 7 years of age who appear on the BFP payroll in the reference period for the six-monthly monitoring of health conditions (see Table 2.3). The second contains information on the attendance of all school-age children on the payroll for the reference period for each bimonthly monitoring of education conditionalities (see Table 2.2). Both databases include an identifier for each person and family, the follow-up period, a variable that identifies whether the authorities have obtained the necessary information (i.e., whether the family has been monitored), a variable that indicates whether the family has met the conditionalities, and the municipality of residence. To maintain temporal consistency, we only considered observations referring to children aged 6 to 17 years.[1]

We constructed the final database in three steps. The first was the aggregation of data on health and education conditionalities at the family level for each follow-up period (biannually for health, bimonthly for education). The second was the annualization of the databases, which is important to observe health and education information within a common period of time and avoid seasonal fluctuations (e.g., school attendance at the beginning of the school year being consistently different from the end). The third was the merging of health and education information into a common (final) base.

To aggregate each database at the household level, we defined a family unit as monitored during

[1] As of 2022, the education base informs the age group of young people. We removed children aged 4 to 6 years from the sample to ensure temporal consistency, since, before 2020, there was no conditionality of education for this audience (see Table 2.1)

a follow-up period if the authorities obtained information on all its members who were subjected to conditionalities. Similarly, we define a monitored family as meeting the conditionalities if it is verified that all its members who are under monitoring have met the required conditions.

To annualize the bases, we consider that a family was monitored or complied with conditionalities in a given year if monitoring or compliance was verified in all observations for that family in that year. When the family changes address and appears in more than one municipality in the reference year, we considered only the observations of the municipality of initial residence. This municipality is then associated with its respective intermediate region. The procedure avoids double-counting of families in the analysis.

Finally, the annualized bases were joined at the family and year level. For the set of families subject to both health and education conditionalities, we created specific variables to denote whether the family was monitored and met all conditionalities simultaneously in that year. A family was considered to have fulfilled all conditionalities in a given year if it had met all health and education conditionalities on an annualized basis. Similarly, the family was deemed to have been monitored if the authorities monitored it both in terms of health and education in the reference year on an annualized basis.

3.2 Conditionalities and Social Mobility of Young Beneficiaries

To investigate how compliance with the BFP conditionalities throughout adolescence is associated with indicators of social insertion and mobility in early adulthood, we built a database combining information from CadÚnico with the database described in the previous subsection. This database contains: (i) individual and family characteristics of all young people born in 1999 who were beneficiaries of the BFP between 13 and 17 years of age; (ii) information on the monitoring and compliance with the program's conditionalities associated with each young person's family; (iii) identification of those who continued in CadÚnico and BFP at the age of 24, being, therefore, low-income or poor; (iv) information on the educational level, insertion in the labor market and the position in the household of the young beneficiaries who remained in CadÚnico at the age of 24.

To build the database of young people born in 1999 who were beneficiaries of the BFP between 13 and 17 years of age, we used CadÚnico, which contains information on members of families with income below 1/2 minimum wage per capita or 3 minimum wages in total. Being in CadÚnico is a prerequisite for entering the BFP payroll. Therefore, we can locate the population of interest by searching for all individuals born in 1999 who are present in the Registry between 2012 and 2016 and identified as beneficiaries of the BFP. When more than one observation was associated with a young person in this period, we collected the oldest. In this way, we obtained individual characteristics of the young person, such as sex, skin color/race, and educational status. In addition, we identified the young person's mother based on the CadÚnico family structure — defined as the woman registered as the family guardian or as the spouse of the family guardian — and constructed a discrete variable referring to her schooling.

The resulting database was later linked to the 2023 CadÚnico, allowing verification of whether each young person was still present in the CadÚnico and whether they were part of a family benefiting from the BFP — therefore, below the poverty line — that year. Additionally, we calculated educational and occupational results of young people present in the 2023 CadÚnico, at 24 years of age, based on the variables of schooling, work, and position in the household.

The final database incorporates information on compliance with health and education conditionalities (described in the previous section) through the Social Registration Number (NIS) of the family responsible associated with each young person. It was then computed that the family was monitored most of the time (in relation to health, education, or all conditionalities at the same time) if it had been correctly monitored in at least 50% of the years in which it appeared in the monitoring database. Similarly, we consider that a family has complied with the conditionalities if it has fulfilled the conditionalities in at least 50% of the years in which it appeared in the monitoring database.

4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this section, we explore the specificities of both the monitoring process and the fulfillment of the BFP conditionalities from a purely empirical perspective. First, we discuss the structure of the data and the inferred scenario about these variables of interest. In a second moment, we conducted an econometric analysis on the statistical association between the fulfillment of the BFP conditionalities by a family and the gains in social mobility of their dependents when compared to those who did not comply with the conditions.[1]

4.1 Overview of Conditionality Monitoring

General Framework We begin our empirical analysis by outlining the process of monitoring the conditionalities of the BFP at the level of the intermediate region (IR), described in Table 4.1.

We observed that, from a governmental perspective, verifying the conditionalities requires obtaining information from a large number of families. In column 3 of Table 4.1, we see that, between 2010 and 2023, the IRs had an annual average of 108.8 thousand families benefiting from the BFP and subject to some conditionality. This value has a high variance, with some IRs reaching 1.4 million beneficiary families and others not reaching 6 thousand. The largest operation is health monitoring, with an annual average of about 102.1 thousand families to be monitored, followed by education, with 75.5 thousand.[2]

In view of this, the main bottleneck of the entire process is obtaining the necessary information — the monitoring — and not compliance with the conditionalities by the monitored families. On average, 60% of the families in IRs that need follow-up are properly monitored. Monitoring in the specific conditionalities of education and health is similar, being around 70%. Of the families monitored, about 93% comply with all the conditions imposed on them.

Due to the low monitoring rates, we emphasize that caution is needed when analyzing the percentage of monitored families that comply with the conditionalities. After all, this number does not necessarily approximate the behavior of all benefited households. It is likely that families who are more likely to follow the rules of the program are also more likely to be observed by education and health agents — for example, because they live in places with better access to public services.

We explore the intertemporal dynamics of monitoring and compliance with conditionalities in Fig-

[1] Importantly, due to the lack of data on monitoring for education conditionalities during the COVID-19 pandemic period (2020 and 2021), our empirical analysis does not perfectly cover the entire study period (2010-2023). In order to ensure the consistency of the empirical treatment, therefore, we removed the health data during the same interregnum of the sample.

[2] This implies that about 63% of families with conditionalities have conditions related to both health and health education.

Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Monitoring of Conditionalities in the Period between 2010 and 2023 (except pandemic)

	Education	Health	Total
Average Number of Households/Year (in 10,000s)	7.56	10.21	10.88
Standard Deviation (in 10,000s)	8.85	12.20	13.03
Monitoring Rate	76.1%	69.6%	60.7%
Compliance Rate (among monitored)	93.4%	96.5%	93.4%

Notes: The values presented are annual averages for the period from 2010 to 2023, excluding information from 2020 and 2021. The first column characterizes the health conditionalities in a given year: the mean and standard deviation of the number of families with some education conditionality in the IR, the percentage of these families that had all health conditionalities monitored in the year (monitoring rate), and the percentage of monitored families that complied with all the requirements (compliance rate). The second column does the same exercise for health conditionalities. The third column characterizes the group of families on which at least one conditionality (whether health, education, or both) is applied. In this case, the monitoring rate refers to the average percentage of households that have all applicable conditionalities properly monitored. The compliance rate, in turn, is the average percentage of households monitored by all applicable conditionalities that met all requirements.

ure 4.1a, having as universe the total number of families that, each year, need to comply with at least one conditionality. We identified that the rate of monitoring families remains stable over time, at about 60.21% of the total number of families registered in the BFP, in agreement with the results in Table 4.1; despite the increase in the number of families enrolled in the program, especially after the pandemic.

Regarding compliance with conditionalities, we observed a positive evolution of this variable over time; i.e., the proportion of households that meet all the conditionalities imposed on them increases over time and, in particular, after the pandemic.

In Figure 4.2a, in turn, we explore the spatial heterogeneity of these statistics, where we find that there were improvements in the monitoring rate in a generalized way throughout the national territory between 2010 and 2023. We highlight that the biggest gains occurred in the Midwest region of the country — both percentage and level evolutions. Finally, we highlight that the monitoring rates tend to be similar in nearby regions, with the best indicators concentrated in the coastal region.

Therefore, we emphasize that any analysis of compliance with the BFP conditionalities is restricted to those families that are monitored, i.e., a restricted subset of the universe of beneficiaries. This characteristic can be a substantial limitation for impact analyses if, for example, only households that meet the conditionalities are self-selected for monitoring, i.e., households already predisposed to comply with the conditionalities are disproportionately subject to monitoring when compared to their counterparts. Comparing the results of Figure 4.1 with those of Figure 4.2b, we notice a strong positive spatial correlation, which strengthens the belief about the risk of selection bias. In addition, the results of this analysis better represent some regions, such as the coastal regions, than others, such as the central northern regions.

Education As indicated in chapter 2, only the education conditionalities apply to adolescents (except in the case of pregnant women). Since these are the focus of our empirical analysis in the next section, we highlight here a space to discuss the intertemporal evolution of this dimension in greater detail.

We also identified in Figure 4.1b, that the monitoring rates of education conditionalities were moder-

Figure 4.1. Evolution of household monitoring rates between 2010-2023



Notes: The results are aggregated to represent the total number of families in the BFP in Brazil. The numbers on the bars represent the percentage of families enrolled in the BFP that are monitored, i.e., the red line divided by the blue line. The gray bar represents the period during which there is no data on the fulfillment of education conditionalities due to COVID-19 and, therefore, is excluded from the analysis.

Figure 4.2. Changes over time and space (p.p.)

(a) Monitoring



(b) Compliance with Conditionalities



Notes: Panels (a) and (b) indicate the difference in the rates of monitoring and compliance with conditionalities (with respect to the universe of households) by IR between 2010 and 2023. The colors indicate five quantiles of the distribution of the respective rates consistently over the years, although the lower bound increases in 2023 due to improvements in monitoring and compliance with conditionalities.

ately high, consistently around 80% during the pre-pandemic period. However, in more recent years (2022 and 2023), this rate has decreased substantially, falling to the level of 63%. This intertemporal disparity is largely due to the entry of families that must meet education conditionalities in the BFP, identified by the more than proportional increase from the blue line *vis-à-vis* the red line.

Regarding the fulfillment of education conditionalities, however, we identified that it had been worsening during the pre-pandemic period; This is observed by the proportional increase of the dark green bar until 2019. For the other periods, in contrast, we see a reversal of this scenario.

Health In a complementary way, we also present an empirical discussion about the fulfillment of health conditionalities. The secondary nature of the discussion about health conditions in this report is due to the fact that it has a less direct relationship with social mobility, although we point out that it does exist (Case et al., 2002; Li et al., 2025).

As indicated in Figure 4.1c, the monitoring rates of health conditionalities are high (approximately 7%) and stable over time, including during the post-pandemic scenario. Remarkably, the rate of compliance with health conditionalities is exceptionally high, registering values close to 100% throughout the historical series and with an intertemporal average of approximately 95%.

In addition to the absolute values, it is observed that the number of families benefiting from the BFP with health conditionalities is substantially and consistently higher than that of families with education conditionalities. This stylized fact is maintained and intensified during the post-pandemic period, when there is an increase of more than 40% in the number of families with health conditions in the BFP. The most surprising and noteworthy is that this increase in the number of families is not accompanied by reductions in the rates of monitoring and compliance with conditionalities. We identified this as a point for future studies, since the full understanding of this experience can be valuable for other public policy projects.

4.2 Conditionalities and the Social Mobility of Young People

In this section, we investigate the relationship between rising socially at the age of 24 and having lived in a family that had the conditionalities of education duly verified and fulfilled in adolescence. We focused the analysis on the group of young people born in 1999 who received BFP between 13 and 17 years of age and we proceeded in two stages. In the first, we measured the association between compliance with verified education conditionalities and two measures of permanence in low-income: (i) being enrolled in CadÚnico in 2023; and (ii) be enrolled in the BFP in 2023, which meansbeing below the poverty line at age 24.[3,4] In the second stage, we analyzed the profile of young people who remained in CadÚnico at the age of 24.

To conduct the proposed analyses, we used the following econometric model:

$$y_{if} = \beta_0 + \beta^{MS} Cond_f + \beta^{G} Fem_i + \beta^{MSG} Cond_f \times Fem_i + \Lambda_f \cdot \gamma_1 + \Lambda_i \cdot \gamma_2 + \varepsilon_{if}$$

[3]Being in CadÚnico is equivalent to signaling that the individual's family has a household income below 1/2 minimum wage per person or 3 minimum wages in total at the age of 24.

[4]Since our universe of analysis are beneficiaries of the BFP, it is reasonable to assume that those who are below the poverty line — and thus, eligible for the program — will be enrolled with a probability close to 1. After all, they know how this benefit works, their family has already had contact with social assistance services, and the program's waiting list was short in 2023, the year in which the young people in the sample turned 24.

Where y_{if} indicates a result corresponding to person i, born in 1999, from a family f, at the age of 24. The $Cond_f$ regressor is an indicator that assumes value 1 when the family has fulfilled the education conditionalities most of the time (i.e., in at least 50% of the years in which it appears on the BFP payroll from 2010 onward) and zero otherwise. This implies that, if a family was not monitored, the value of this variable is zero. The Fem_i dummy variable indicates whether person i is a woman. The analysis is controlled by two sets (matrices) of independent variables, Λ_i and Λ_f, which are, respectively, composed of observable characteristics of both the person and their family at the time of first observation in the CadÚnico. Namely, the variables we used as control are: IR of residence, mother's education, race/skin color of the dependent, year of initial observation in CadÚnico, and number of times the family was on the CadÚnico payroll. Finally, the observations are weighted according to the expected probability of survival up to 24 years of age, according to estimates by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE (2024). Thus, the proposed model can be understood as a "weighted least squares".

Therefore, β^{MS} represents the difference in percentage points in the statistical probability of each outcome between: i) male dependents of the BFP between 13 and 17 years of age, whose compliance with the education requirements was duly verified by the authorities most of the time; ii) dependents between 13 and 17 years of age of the BFP with similar demographic characteristics, whose family should have fulfilled education conditionalities on the same number of occasions, but whose compliance with these criteria was not consistently verified. Thus, β^{MS} is the association between the results of male adolescents at the age of 24 and the success of the entire process of monitoring conditionalities — including their verification and assistance to families who did not comply with them to overcome vulnerabilities. The sum of the β^{MS} and β^{MSG} coefficients represents the same association for the results at 24 years of age of adolescent women.

We report the results of the econometric analysis in Table 4.2. In the first and second columns, we present the association between compliance with conditionality and permanence in the CadÚnico and the BFP, respectively. We found that young people whose families were monitored and met the BFP education requirements were less likely to be in the BFP at age 24, a result that is driven by women. In the case of men, the results in poverty are not significant, and the probability of being in the CadÚnico is slightly higher.

In columns 3 to 7, we explored characteristics associated with human development and the quality of life of these 24-year-old dependents. Thus, the purpose of this exercise is to investigate whether compliance with the BFP education conditionalities is associated with potential gains even for those who did not experience upward social mobility.

Even among the poorest, human capital gains were significant. In column 3, we see that, when the family was seen to meet education conditionalities, the male adolescent beneficiaries completed high school by the age of 24 with a 14.42 percentage point higher probability. Girls, in turn, saw an increase of 15.33 percentage points. We see in columns 4 and 5 that this educational gain is also associated with a greater probability of studying and improving their human capital at 24 and of exceeding the mothers' schooling, which indicates educational mobility.

In addition, we identified in column 7 a positive association between compliance with the conditions and having worked in the week prior to the December CadÚnico interview — an association that is stronger in the case of men and can lead to human capital gains through professional experience. In summary, we understand that, among young people of both genders present in CadÚnico at the age of 24, verified compliance with conditionalities is associated with significant improvements in

Table 4.2. Associações Entre Atendimento das Condicionalidades Educacionais e Desempenho Futuro

	Universe		Remaining in CadÚnico at 24				
	CadÚnico	BFP	High School	Studies	School > Mother	Resp./spouse	Worked
Education Cond.	0.0196***	-0.0006	0.1442***	0.0178***	0.0210***	-0.0183***	0.0249***
	(0.0033)	(0.0031)	(0.0062)	(0.0024)	(0.0050)	(0.0041)	(0.0033)
Woman	0.2250***	0.2255***	0.0781***	-0.0403***	0.0338***	0.3436***	-0.0610***
	(0.0034)	(0.0048)	(0.0039)	(0.0028)	(0.0032)	(0.0076)	(0.0091)
Educ. Cond. ×Women	-0.0166***	-0.0212***	0.0091**	-0.0018	-0.0032	-0.0354***	-0.0199***
	(0.0023)	(0.0025)	(0.0028)	(0.0023)	(0.0029)	(0.0038)	(0.0047)
FE: Intermediate Region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE: Mother's education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE: Race/Skin color	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE: Base year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE: Education Count	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,210,225	2,210,225	1,016,593	1,059,913	850,360	1,059,914	1,059,412
R^2	0.0975	0.1275	0.0476	0.0168	0.0386	0.1175	0.0203
Average Y (total)	0.453	0.271	0.687	0.135	0.700	0.645	0.448
Average Y (men)	0.355	0.175	0.639	0.160	0.687	0.457	0.491

$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the intermediate region (IR) level in parentheses. All models include fixed IR effects, mother´s educational attainment, race/skin color, reference year of the individual's first observation in CadÚnico, and number of times the dependent's family appeared between 2012 and 2023 on the CadÚnico payroll. All observations were weighted corresponding to the probability of survival until the age of 24 of the analyzed individuals, following the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE (2024).

human capital, which may mean a greater probability of future social ascension.

Markedly, compliance with conditionalities is also negatively associated (for both men and women) with family independence, in the sense that these young people are less likely to be responsible for or spouses of their family unit at the age of 24. This means that these young people may not have emerged from poverty and low income because they are in the process of improving their human capital and have not emancipated themselves, which may occur in later years.

5. CONCLUSION

This study investigated the association between compliance with the conditionalities of the Bolsa Família Program (BFP) and the social mobility of young people from beneficiary families, based on administrative microdata between 2010 and 2023. It was observed that about 60% of the families with conditionalities were effectively monitored throughout the period, with important variations between regions. Among the families monitored, more than 90% complied with all the requirements in the areas of health and education — evidence that compliance, when there is follow-up, is largely in the majority. These results reinforce the importance of expanding and consolidating monitoring systems as an instrument for qualifying the policy.

A first analysis was conducted with the universe of young people in the database, aiming to estimate the association between the fulfillment of education conditionalities and emancipation from both the Unified Registry (CadÚnico) and the BFP. The results indicated that there is a negative relationship between these variables, primarily driven by women. The results regarding the emancipation of the BFP are particularly strong, in which women who consistently met the education conditionalities have a 2.12 p.p. lower probability of recidivism.

The second analysis was conducted with a focus on young people born in 1999 who, at the age of 24, were still registered in CadÚnico — that is, individuals who remain in a situation of vulnerability and for whom the full effects of social mobility may not yet have been consolidated. Within this group, young people whose families regularly complied with educational conditions had better human capital indicators. The high school completion rate was 14 percentage points higher among men (average of 63.9%) and 15 percentage points higher among women (total average of 68.7%). There was also a higher probability that they were engaged in studying (1.8 p.p.), of having surpassed their mother's schooling (2.1 p.p.), and, among men, of having engaged in work recently (2.5 p.p., with an average of 49.1%). Although these young people are still included in the CadÚnico, the educational gains observed indicate an accumulation of capacities that can be reflected in better opportunities in the medium term.

These findings suggest that the success of conditionalities depends on an institutional tripod. First, it is necessary to strengthen monitoring mechanisms, especially in municipalities with lower coverage, ensuring technical support, system integration, and operational stability. Second, the policy must be articulated with complementary actions that increase the return on educational investment: professional training programs, permanence scholarships, supervised internships, and articulation with technical secondary education can accelerate the transition to the world of work. Third, it is essential to consolidate the use of administrative data as a management and evaluation tool, contributing to territorial diagnoses and periodic adjustments in the design and implementation of policies. The transformative potential of the BFP in the long term depends on the ability to

integrate income transfers with human capital development. Conditions, if effectively implemented and articulated with complementary policies, can be consolidated as one of the main channels to expand young people's opportunities and promote social mobility in the medium and long term.

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